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future kidney transplants enables living donation to occur when optimal for the donor and transplantation
to occur later, when and if needed by the recipient. Methods: The donation of a kidney at a time that
is optimal for the donor generates a “voucher” that only a specified recipient may redeem later when
needed. The voucher provides the recipient with priority in being matched with a living donor from the
end of a future transplantation chain. Besides its use in persons of advancing age with a limited window
for donation, vouchers remove a disincentive to kidney donation, namely, a reluctance to donate now lest
one’s family member should need a transplant in the future. Results: We describe the first three voucher
cases, in which advancing age might otherwise have deprived the donors the opportunity to provide a
kidney to a family member. These 3 voucher donations functioned in a nondirected fashion and triggered
25 transplants through kidney paired donation across the United States. Conclusions: The provision of
a voucher to potential recipients whose need for a transplant makes them “chronologically incompatible”
with their donors may increase the number of living donor transplants.
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Background. The waiting list for kidney transplantation is long. The creation of “vouchers” for future kidney transplants enables
living donation to occur when optimal for the donor and transplantation to occur later, when and if needed by the recipient.
Methods. The donation of a kidney at a time that is optimal for the donor generates a “voucher” that only a specified recipient
may redeem later when needed. The voucher provides the recipient with priority in being matched with a living donor from the end
of a future transplantation chain. Besides its use in persons of advancing age with a limited window for donation, vouchers remove
a disincentive to kidney donation, namely, a reluctance to donate now lest one’s family member should need a transplant in
the future.Results.Wedescribe the first three voucher cases, in which advancing agemight otherwise have deprived the donors
the opportunity to provide a kidney to a family member. These 3 voucher donations functioned in a nondirected fashion and trig-
gered 25 transplants through kidney paired donation across the United States.Conclusions.The provision of a voucher to po-
tential recipients whose need for a transplant makes them “chronologically incompatible” with their donors may increase the
number of living donor transplants.
(Transplantation 2017;101: 2115–2119)
For transplantation to be a truly effective treatment forend-stage organ failure, the number of organ donors,
and hence the supply of transplantable organs, must continue
to grow. In June 2016, theWhite House Organ Summit iden-
tified several strategies for reaching this goal, including
removing financial and other disincentives for living dona-
tion and utilizing more nondirected living donors.1
Approximately 35% of patients with a relative or friend
willing to donate a kidney are unable to accept that kidney
due to biological incompatability.2,3 Kidney paired donation
(KPD) was first used in the United States in 2000 as a means
of allowing a transplant to occur in such circumstances.4
Based on identifying reciprocal compatibilities in two un-
matched donor–recipient pairs, KPD occurs when a kidney
from the donor in one pair is transplanted into the recipient
in the other, and vice versa (Figure 1). When multiple swaps
were combined into chains, the surgeries were initially car-
ried out simultaneously but then moved to sequential
transplants, with one donor giving to the recipient in an-
other pair, whose donor then extends the chain by donat-
ing to the next recipient.5 With the introduction in 2007
of nondirected (altruistic) donors to initiate chains, KPD
can extend over weeks to months and involve multiple
centers in different cities (Figure 2).5
In 2008, a donor’s need to give his kidney a week before
the recipient in his incompatible pair was scheduled to receive
a kidney from a nondirected donor occasioned the first depar-
ture from the usual KPD sequence. Without this alteration,
the chain would not have existed, and seven downstream re-
cipients would not have been transplanted.6 The utility of
such out-of-sequence donations led the National Kidney Reg-
istry in 2012 to create the Advanced Donation Program, in
which 21 transplant centers currently participate.7
The voucher program is an expansion of KPD and is fun-
damentally different from the currently existing advanced
Received 8 January 2017. Revision received 22 February 2017.
Accepted 12 March 2017.
1 David Geffen School of Medicine at UCLA, Los Angeles, CA.
2 Gould School of Law, USC, Los Angeles, CA.
3 Keck School of Medicine, USC, Los Angeles, CA.
4 New York–Presbyterian Weill Cornell Medical Center, New York, CA.
5 Department of Economics, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA.
Jeffrey L. Veale, MD, SuzanneMcGuire, RN, BSN, Marian Charlton, RN, and Sandip
Kapur, MD are on the National Kidney Registry Medical Board. None of the other
authors disclose any funding or conflicts of interest.
J.L.V.: manuscript development, data interpretation, literature search, writing, figure
development. A.M.C.: manuscript development, writing, literature search, medico-
legal counsel. N.N.: manuscript development, literature search, writing, figure
development, data interpretation. G.M.D.: manuscript development, writing. H.A.G.:
manuscript development, writing. A.W.: manuscript development, writing. J.D-P.:
manuscript development. J.C.H.: manuscript development. M.P.: manuscript devel-
opment, writing, medical economics counsel. S.M.: manuscript development, writing.
M.C.: manuscript development. S.K.: manuscript development.
Correspondence: Jeffrey L. Veale, MD, UCLA Kidney Transplantation Exchange
Program, David Geffen School of Medicine at UCLA, 200 Medical Plaza, Suite
140, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1738. (JVeale@mednet.ucla.edu).




Transplantation ■ September 2017 ■ Volume 101 ■ Number 9 www.transplantjournal.com 2115
Copyright © 2017 Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc. All rights reserved.
donation program in that voucher recipients are not in need
of a kidney transplant and may never need a kidney trans-
plant. Additionally, donors in the voucher program function
as nondirected donors by initiating chains without adding a
paired recipient to the current chain. When a voucher is
redeemed, a future chain of transplantation will end by pro-
viding the voucher recipient with a compatible kidney.
A Solution for Chronological Incompatibility
Besides biological incompatibility, a willing donor may
also find that “chronological incompatibility” stands in the
way of providing a kidney to a relative or friend because
the optimal time to donate a kidney occurs long before the
intended recipient needs a transplant. In this proof-of-concept
report, we describe the first three cases utilizing a “voucher”
to overcome chronological incompatibility and, in the pro-
cess, to trigger KPD chains. These 3 donors enabled 25 kid-
ney transplantations to occur across the United States.
Vouchers are recorded in the National Kidney Registry’s da-
tabase and represent a commitment to provide the donors’
intended recipients (who do not currently need a transplant)
priority to receive a kidney from a living donor at the end of a
future chain (Figure 3).
Case 1
A 4-year-old child with chronic kidney disease (CKD) at-
tributed to a poorly functioning solitary native kidney was
expected to require a renal transplant in 10 to 15 years.
The child’s grandfather, a 64-year-old judge, was prepared
to donate a kidney when his grandson needed it. Rather than
allow his candidacy as a living donor to disappear as he aged,
the grandfather approached the UCLA Kidney Transplant
Program to discuss the possibility of donating a kidney im-
mediately, with the pledge that when needed his grandson
would receive priority in getting a living donor transplant.
The UCLA Living Donor Committee and the National
Kidney Registry Medical Board approved the voucher that
embodies this pledge, with several stipulations: it has no
monetary value and can be used only by the grandson and
not transferred to another patient. Further, all parties in-
volved agreed that while the Registry is committed to taking
the steps necessary to provide a transplant, the voucher can-
not ensure that a suitable kidney would be available. These
points were explicitly stated in the informed consent docu-
ments, which were discussed with and signed by both the do-
nor and the guardian of the intended recipient. A thorough
evaluation of the donor, including psychological testing, es-
tablished that he was medically suitable, highly educated,
clearly informed, and that he understood that his grandson
would be prioritized for, but not guaranteed, a future living
donor kidney.
In December 2014, the grandfather underwent a living do-
nor nephrectomy at UCLA, initiating a transplant chain with
three recipients, who discontinued dialysis andwere removed
from the deceased donor waitlist. The grandson’s renal status
has not yet warranted redemption of the voucher.
Case 2
In 2007, when shewas 10, a girl underwent a kidney trans-
plant from a living donor. Nine years later, her graft function
remained excellent, but her 52-year-old father wanted to do-
nate a “back-up” kidney in case his daughter’s allograft even-
tually failed. The father welcomed the use of the voucher
because he wanted to make his donation before he became
too old to do so. In August 2015, at New York–Presbyterian
Weill Cornell Medical Center, the father donated a kidney,
triggering a chain of eight transplants and assuring that if his
FIGURE1. Kidneypaired donation. A two-way swap is demonstrated,
where the donor of the first incompatible pair donates to the recipient
of the second incompatible pair and vice versa.
FIGURE 2. Chains of transplantation. A nondirected donor donates to a recipient of an incompatible pair. Rather than the chain terminating in
the donation to a recipient on the deceased donor waitlist, the last donor serves as a bridge, propagating the chain.
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daughter needs a second allograft in the future, she will be pri-
oritized for a living donor from the end of a future KPD chain.
Case 3
Due to the young age of the patient in the previous case,
her clinicians believe that she may someday require a third
kidney transplant to avoid having to go onto dialysis. There-
fore, in May 2016, the patient’s 60-year-old aunt also do-
nated a kidney at New York–Presbyterian Weill Cornell
Medical Center, initiating a chain of 14 kidney transplants
while also providing a second voucher for her niece.
DISCUSSION
Evolution of Vouchers
The growth of KPD in the United States has been driven by
innovations that aim to remove logistical and bureaucratic
barriers, especially those that disincentive donation. Ad-
vanced donation emerged as a short-term accommodation
for donors with a deadline to return to work or the like,
which leads to the donation sequence being altered pro-
spectively.6 In contrast, when an unexpected recipient event
delays transplantation, the donor–recipient pair is often placed
into the advanced donation program retrospectively.8 In ei-
ther case, at the time of their donor’s nephrectomy, paired re-
cipients in the advanced donation program need a transplant,
which typically occurs within several weeks to months of
the donation.6,8
Vouchers represent another expansion of KPD and exhibit
two fundamental differences from standard advanced dona-
tions. First, the intended recipients are not yet in need of a
kidney transplant and may never need a kidney transplant.
Second, voucher donors function as nondirected donors
who can initiate chains because they do not add a paired re-
cipient to the current chain. When voucher holders do not
progress to end-stage renal failure, die first from other causes,
or become medically unsuitable for transplantation, their
voucherswould not be redeemed, so the donor would remain
nondirected. Moreover, as the third case demonstrates, the
opportunity to obtain a voucher can stimulatemultiple dona-
tions for a patient who may need one or more transplants in
a lifetime, increasing the likelihood that some of these
vouchers will never be redeemed. When and if a voucher is
redeemed, the donation becomes equivalent to any other
KPD donor’s, albeit separated from the recipient’s transplant
by an extended period.
In what follows, we explain how vouchers could substan-
tially increase the number of KDP chains and thus remove
patients from the deceased donor waitlist. When adopting
vouchers, however, networks of transplant centers will need
to consider the effects on nondirected donation and guard
against the potential for organ vending, donors gaming the
system, and unsustainability.
Vouchers’ Potential
Vouchers can motivate many groups of people to donate.
As illustrated by the three cases, one group consists of donors
who fear that with advancing age they will become unable to
donate to a specific person, who does not yet need a first or
replacement transplant. Similarly, people who are anticipat-
ing life events such as relocation, marriage, or childbirth that
could affect their donation candidacy can donate a kidney
now to do good in the future, when that help is needed. If
only a fraction of the 40 million CKD patients in the United
States had a donor like the grandfather in case 1, then tens
of thousands of high-quality organs would enter the system.
Cases 2 and 3 suggest that another great potential for
vouchers resides with the family and friends of the 200 000
transplant recipients in the United States whose current allo-
graft may eventually fail.9 Many of these people are well in-
formed about transplantation and may indeed have been
evaluated and found suitable to donate when the patient re-
ceived his or her current allograft. Were even a small percent-
age to donate, the supply of living donor organs could be
greatly increased, especially because, as cases 2 and 3 illus-
trate, a single patient may inspire multiple acts of donation,
decreasing the probability for voucher redemption.
FIGURE 3. Voucher program. A currently viable live donor (D*) initiates a chain of transplantations like a nondirected donor in exchange for a
voucher provided to a recipient (R*) who may need a kidney in the future. The transplantation chain continues per current standards. Arrows
reflect the intended (dashed, black arrow) or actual (solid, green arrow) flow of kidneys within a chain of transplantation. A future chain of trans-
plantation (dashed, green arrow) will end in R*, when the voucher is redeemed.
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Another group of donors would be produced by vouchers’
ability to overcome a major disincentive to nondirected do-
nation, namely, reluctance to donate lest one’s currently
healthy spouse or child needs a transplant in the future. Al-
though the voucher programwill create the burden of having
to provide kidneys for recipients designated by some number
of people who would have become nondirected donors any-
way, it will also motivate others whose altruistic tendencies
are held back by their concern that they need to hold on to
their ability to donate. If several of these potential nondi-
rected donors are reassured by vouchers, the number of pa-
tients who receive transplants will increase not only because
many vouchers will never be redeemed (because relatively
few healthy people develop kidney failure) but more impor-
tantly because each nondirected donor enables an average
of 4.7 recipients with incompatible donors to receive a trans-
plant from a living donor.10
What Vouchers Are and Are Not
Vouchers are ameans of overcoming chronological incom-
patibility between donor and recipient pairs, and removing a
disincentive for donation. They are supplements to, not sub-
stitutes for, the normal process of screening donors medically
and psychosocially, as well as informing them about what is
involved in donation. Informed consent for both donor and
recipient are of utmost importance to the success of the pro-
gram. Besides disclosing the potential risks and burdens asso-
ciated with organ donation, transplant teams need to ensure
that donors and intended recipients understand that while
vouchers provide priority for a living donor transplant
should that need materialize, they cannot guarantee that
one will be available. Vouchers also neither help nor hurt
recipients’ status on the deceased donation waitlist. The
matching algorithm of the National Kidney Registry is fo-
cused on the creation of chains with clusters that maximize
the number of transplants facilitated. A candidate redeeming
a voucher is the third of six categories in the current priority,
following, first, a nondirected donor who needs a transplant,
having previously donated as part of the National Kidney
Registry, and, second, mending a chain where a recipient
did not receive a kidney because of a real-time swap failure.11
When the voucher is redeemed, a future chain will end with
the identified voucher recipient.
During the evaluation process, two other points need to be
clear. First, the original donor must affirm that he or she has
received no money or “valuable consideration” for donating
the organ that will generate the voucher. Second, the voucher
has no cash value and cannot be sold or bartered to another
person. When the person listed on an unredeemed voucher
dies or becomes permanently ineligible for kidney transplan-
tation, the voucher expires. To avoid surreptitious paid ex-
changes, the identity of voucher recipients, who are selected
prior to donor nephrectomy, must be recorded (photo identi-
fication, ABO blood group, and tissue type) to permit confir-
mation when vouchers are redeemed.
In the three reported cases, only virtual vouchers—that is,
electronic records that can be called up from the network’s
database when needed—were created. A physical voucher
could provide recipients with secure evidence that the pledge
of help in getting a renal allograft will not be withdrawn. Yet
a printed document might generate misunderstanding be-
cause it might seem more like other sorts of vouchers, such
as gift vouchers with a specified monetary value or certifi-
cates that entitle the bearer to a good or service, based on
having purchased something else. In any case, the term itself
is appropriate because it has traditionally meant any docu-
ment that provides proof of a fact. Here, the voucher attests
to the original donation having generated a credit with a
transplant network so that, should the medical need arise in
the future, a specified person will have priority for a spot at
the end of a KDP chain.
Further Points to Consider
Another concern is that some voucher participants may try
to “game the system” by donating before their intended re-
cipient needs a transplant to give the recipient a chance to re-
ceive a better organ than anticipated through traditional
KPD. Like any potential recipient, a candidate redeeming a
voucher may refuse an offered kidney in hopes of getting a
better one, but doing so comes with the burden of more time
on thewaitlist. Evenwithout suchmanipulation, in situations
like case 1, the potential recipient is likely to receive a consid-
erably better kidney (if needed) in a few years than the kidney
donated by his 64-year-old grandfather. However, from the
viewpoint of the whole system, the kidney donated by the
grandfather was a very good one; it added significant net
value by unlocking two younger, previously unutilized living
donors from their paired incompatibilities, thereby removing
three patients from the constraints of dialysis.
Any organization responsible for a voucher program
would be concerned if requests exceed the availability of
chain-end donors, resulting in an inability of potential recip-
ients to redeem their vouchers. The likelihood of this occur-
ring should remain low as each voucher donor will start a
chain in which other donors, freed from their cross-match in-
compatibilities, create additional chain-ending donors.12,13
Additionally, only a portion of vouchers will be redeemed
due to the designated recipient’s death or lack of progression
to severe kidney disease. Voucher programs will also need a
policy to choose among several potential recipients who all
match the same chain-ending donor. Priority could go to
the patient with the highest panel of reactive antibody level
or the one who has held a voucher for the longest time. Fur-
ther, as with any deceased or living donor program, highly
sensitized and “O” blood group candidates will be a concern
for voucher programs. The more widely the program is
adopted, the more likely that suitable donors will be found
for all recipients redeeming vouchers.
A final issue is how to ensure appropriate follow-through,
given the voluntary nature of the networks through which
KPD is currently managed and the extended timeframe for
voucher redemptions. The National Kidney Registry seems
to be an appropriate organization to satisfy these voucher
contracts, as it is the leading multicenter KPD organization,
composed of over 70 centers, and has facilitated over 2000
transplants. Transplant centers, as protectors of the interests
of their patients, should ensure that, were the Registry to un-
dergo a change of control, any successor organization will
have the same (or better) capacity to honor all the obligations
created by any outstanding vouchers. Given the role of the
United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) as the official
Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, it would
be reasonable for it to establish rules to provide voucher recip-
ients with deceased donors if they cannot be placed at the end
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of a living donor chain, especially considering that the Na-
tional Kidney Registry has contributed hundreds of “chain-
ending” living donor kidneys to recipients on the deceased
donor waitlist. Obtaining a variance from UNOS is likely to
take several years, during which the voucher program should
move ahead under its existing auspices as an innovative—and
sustainable—means of increasing transplants.
Iterations of the many potential situations that may arise
beyond the current framework must be addressed as encoun-
tered, with appropriate regulatory changes made as needed.
This has been the experience with each evolutionary step in
KPD to date, from the establishment of swaps, chains of trans-
plantation, out-of-sequence chains, and now, with vouchers.
CONCLUSION
The creation of vouchers for future kidney transplants is a
substantial improvement in KPD that enables living donation
to occur when optimal for the donor and transplantation to
occur later, when and if needed by the recipient. The original
donation functions in a nondirected fashion, triggering a KPD
chain, such as those that followed the 3 proof-of-concept
cases presented here, which together resulted in 25 trans-
plants nationally. If any of the vouchers in these cases are
redeemed, a future chain will end with the identified voucher-
recipient, thus overcoming the “chronological incompati-
bility” between the patient and his or her donor. If a
voucher is never redeemed, then the donor will have truly
been a nondirected donor, with all that implies for increas-
ing the number of transplants. This innovation could, if
broadly adopted, significantly increase the number of living
donor transplants performed and thereby reduce the waiting
time for a deceased donor transplant.
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